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I. INTRODUCTION On a sprawling ranch encompassing parts of Colorado, Wyoming, and Utah, a group of Chilean cattle herders worked for a prominent ranching family after being brought to the United States on H-2A visas. 1 While on the ranch, their employers held their documents and prevented them from personally accessing their earnings in the bank. 2 They worked seven days per week, up to sixteen hours per day, and earned approximately two to three dollars per hour, often performing work in violation of their visas.
3 One worker, who was thrown and kicked by a horse, not only had to wait seven days to be taken to a hospital, but was also forced to work through his head and chest injuries. 4 After he filed a claim for worker's compensation, his boss subsequently interrogated him on videotape in order to get him to rescind his claim.
5
When two other workers asked to leave, the boss denied them their money, passports, and documents and threatened them with deportation. 6 Several of the workers ultimately escaped from the ranch, including two brothers who came across a hunter and used his cell phone to call for help. 7 After the workers' conditions came to light, federal law enforcement declined to prosecute the employer because the workers were not physically restrained, 3. Id. 4. Id. TO FORCED LABOR 96-97 (2010) .
VERITÉ, IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN US AGRICULTURE: THE ROLE OF LABOR BROKERS IN VULNERABILITY
6. Frazier, supra note 2. 7. Id. 8. Telephone Interview with Kimi Jackson, Attorney, ProBAR (Jan. 3, 2012) . 9. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 , Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1466 -68 (2000 ; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2000) (stating that the procurement of human are essentially excluded from meaningful membership to our society. 19 At the same time that the government has failed to avail itself of affirmative investigative initiatives at its disposal, it has authorized private civil remedies that can be invoked by immigrant workers. The federal government's failure to protect workers, and its creation of these private civil remedies, presents an implicit devolution of rights from the federal government to individual workers. 20 The TVPA created not only immigration remedies for victims of a severe form of human trafficking but also a private right of action for violations of peonage, slavery, and human trafficking crimes. REV. 787, 80506 (2008) (noting that local lawmakers "have expressed frustration with enforcement failures at the national level and thus see a need to take their own action"); Rodriguez, supra note 18, at 59091 (arguing that the inability to achieve a comprehensive national policy is reflected in the diverse local laws that have arisen to address unauthorized immigration).
21. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 , Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008 ; Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of , Pub. L. No. 109-164, 119 Stat. 3558 (2005 ; Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of , Pub. L. No. 108-193, 117 Stat. 2875 ; Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 , Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000 . workplace crimes. 23 The private right of action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) can be used against employers for criminal exploitation in the workplace. 24 Organizers around the country are using local, state, and federal laws to address wage theft. 25 Increasingly, immigrant workers are using antidiscrimination laws to characterize their employer's criminal conduct against them as a form of racial or national origin discrimination. 26 Notably, a governmental impetus to combat crime is behind many of these opportunities for private civil remedies.
Many commentators have noted the failure of the government to address the exploitation of immigrants 27 and have correspondingly advocated for a reformulation of governmental practices and 23. NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, THE U VISA: HOW CAN IT PROTECT IMMIGRANT WORKERS? (Aug. 03, 2012) , available at http://www.nelp.org/page/-/Justice/2012/UvisaFlyer EnglishSpanish.pdf?nocdn=1; Memorandum from Naomi C. Earp, Chair, U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, to Dist. Dirs. and Reg'l Attorneys (July 3, 2008) , available at http:// iwp.legalmomentum.org/immigration/u-visa/government-memoranda-and-factsheets/U%20VISA _EEOC%20Certification%20Memo_7.3.08.pdf; Memorandum from Nancy J. Leppink, Acting Adm'r, U.S. Dep't of Labor, to Reg'l Admins. and Dist. Dirs. (Apr. 28, 2011) , available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/FieldBulletins/fab2011_1.pdf.
24. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 , Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970 .
25. NIK THEODORE, UNIV. OF ILL. AT CHI., THE MOVEMENT TO END WAGE THEFT: A REPORT TO THE DISCOUNT FOUNDATION 10-12, 16-17 (Oct. 2011) 1991 , Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991 ; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 , Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964 ; Civil Rights Act of 1866 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § § 1981-1982 (1982) 230-31 (2007) (arguing that immigrant workers should utilize remedies that apply international human right norms).
32. Some legal scholarship has forcefully expressed skepticism about the use of the law, much less legal remedies, to create meaningful social change. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 513 (1976) ; see also Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443, 451-53 (2001) (providing a brief review of progressive legal scholarship and its skepticism toward law as a vehicle for social change). The use of the judicial system still remains, however, an accessible, if not important, By using the lens of the guest worker program, this Article examines to what end the devolution of rights via private civil remedies can be leveraged to benefit immigrant workers. With the rather dismal picture of government inaction, it is not surprising that advocates have been particularly motivated to consider the use of private civil remedies to address the recurring dilemmas within the guest worker system. Guest workers, like the H-2A cattle herders, have used such remedies to seek redress for their criminal exploitation.
33
Private civil remedies create worker agency because workers can vindicate their rights without having to rely on governmental institutions that have historically failed to enforce workplace violations of the law. These remedies also give workers the opportunity to counter the characterization of being passive victims who otherwise can only be assisted "by the largesse of the benign state."
34
Even when private civil remedies provide for mixed results, workers still participate in reshaping the boundaries of the law and produce counternarratives that can confer legitimacy on a movement's claims.
35
By placing the employer's conduct into the broader context of criminal exploitation of all workers, these avenue for the politically powerless to bring about justice. Scott L. Cummings, Litigation at Work: Defending Day Labor in Los Angeles, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1617 REV. , 1621 REV. (2011 (finding that the underlying conditions point in favor of a litigation-based approach for day laborers in Los Angeles, not only because these day laborers are politically weak, but also because they possess a strong legal right to solicit work in public that, if protected, is self-enforcing); Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Redefining the Rights of Undocumented Workers, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1361 REV. , 1405 REV. (2009 To begin this analysis, Part I gives a brief background on the inherent nature of exploitation within guest worker programs and the failure of the federal government to act as a watchdog over this exploitation in both the civil and criminal arenas.
Part II explores how the lack of government action has led to the devolving use of private civil remedies to redress guest worker exploitation by focusing on three specific examples. In particular, it examines how the private right of action under the TVPA and RICO, as well as the use of antidiscrimination laws, are particularly well suited to address the egregious abuses that arise out of a flawed guest worker system. This Part also considers how the use of such remedies has advanced the conceptual framework of these laws to encompass multiple forms of exploitation.
Part III examines how this devolution of rights can lead to guest worker empowerment, but it also reviews the fundamental constraints associated with asserting these rights in a judicial forum. Private civil remedies bestow workers with agency and can be extended to immigrant workers who work without authorization. Immigrant workers, however, legitimately fear reporting workplace exploitation, so the use of such remedies must necessarily be integrated with other measures, such as outreach and educational efforts, crime-related victim visas, litigation tools to protect client identity and immigration status, and the support of community-based organizations. A delicate balance is also required so that private civil remedies do not operate contrary to collective efforts for social change. Rather, by producing important counternarratives that can ultimately influence the public debate, they should be used in concert with organizing, education, and policy reform. Taken with these constraints, then, Part III concludes that private civil remedies are worth considering as a significant strategy for advancing guest worker rights.
36. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 32, at 1402 (arguing that enforcement of wage and antidiscrimination rights "constitutes collective action that ensures better working conditions for immigrants and citizens alike"). Under these visa programs, employers may bring foreign workers from abroad for a temporary time period, if the employers are able to prove that no U.S. workers are available for the job. 40 As part of this process, employers are required to submit labor-certification applications to the DOL, certifying that they have recruited U.S. workers for the specified job positions.
II. BACKGROUND

41
Only after receiving an approved DOL labor certification may employers then apply for the visas with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and actually bring workers to the United States.
42
A. Guest Worker Programs
Facilitate Labor Abuses As one worker advocate has astutely observed, "guest workers are not free and have no rights of membership in society." 40. 20 C.F.R. § § 655.135, 655.40 (2012 so that the employer maintains total control over the worker. The employer "dictates the terms and conditions of the contract, terminates the guest worker at will, and determines whether to extend the work relationship." 45 Further, since H-2 visas are temporary and do not provide a path to lawful permanent residency, guest workers are a de facto underclass of immigrant workers who lack the benefits that come with integrating into U.S. society.
46
The inherent imbalance of power that exists between guest workers and employers keeps workers silent in the face of abusive immigrant workers are currently the subject of debate and that new studies depict how low-wage migrant workers suffer severe mistreatment); Lisa Guerra, Note, 46. Ontiveros, supra note 43, at 938 (stating that guest worker visas limit the ability of workers to participate fully in U.S. society); Rodriguez, supra note 29, at 222 (finding that guest worker programs impose bureaucratic requirements that constrain immigrant mobility in the economy and therefore in society at large). The isolation of these workers erects additional barriers that prevent them from addressing abuses. Elmore, supra note 27, at 552; Holley, supra note 27, at 594-95. working conditions. Guest workers fear retaliation by employers, which can include deportation, blacklisting, and denial of rehiring for the following season.
47
This climate of fear can be created by the employers' explicit threats to call DHS, the existence of a blacklist, or even the mere fact that the employer holds the "deportation card."
48
The North Carolina Growers' Association, for example, maintained a blacklist of H-2A workers who were barred from rehire for the following season because they had complained about job conditions, such as the inability to access drinking water in the fields.
49
Guest workers may also fear voicing complaints if they arrive in the United States with significant debt. Unscrupulous recruiters can charge workers for travel, visa, and recruitment costs.
50
In one case, H-2A workers from Thailand were charged tens of thousands of dollars and required to take out risky loans and mortgage family farmland to pay recruitment costs.
51
Despite labor abuses, arriving in the United States in debt motivates workers to remain on the job because quitting is not a viable option.
52
As a result, employers can exploit guest workers more readily than native low-wage workers. Reported abuses include the confiscation of documents, wage and hour violations, neglect of onthe-job injuries, unsafe and unhealthy housing conditions, verbal and physical abuse, and sexual violence.
53
Guest workers with significant recruitment debt become susceptible to debt bondage and forced 47. Elmore, supra note 27, at 542; Holley, supra note 27, at 596-97; Read, supra note 39, at 430-31.
48. S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 14, at 15; Hall, supra note 12, at 533. 49. David Bacon, Be Our Guests, NATION, Sept. 27, 2004, at 23. 50 . S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 14, at 9-14; Gavito, supra note 43, at 5; Holley, supra note 27, at 596. The recently revised H-2A regulations, which prohibit such charges, still permit this practice to flourish as employers can simply turn a blind eye. FARMWORKER JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 22. labor. 54 Abuses, such as the confiscation of documents, intimidation, and threats, can be connected to human trafficking.
55
As long as the underlying structural flaw of guest worker programs remains intacthaving workers tied to a single employer by a temporary visaworkers will lack free choice and the abuses will continue.
56
B. Government Enforcement
Is Inadequate Multiple government agencies could play a role in addressing the exploitation of guest workers. The reality, however, is that government oversight has largely failed to provide protection for guest workers.
The DOL oversees the regulatory scheme designed to ensure that the employment of H-2 workers does not adversely affect the compensation and working conditions of U.S. workers.
57
The Wage and Hour Division (WHD) of the DOL is authorized to enforce the terms and conditions of H-2 workers' employment to ensure compliance with the regulations.
58
The Employment and Training Administration (ETA) of the DOL oversees employer participation in the H-2 program by approving labor certifications for employers that can show that they comply with the program requirements.
59
The DOL regulatory framework that purportedly protects guest workers has remained largely theoretical and has failed to address workplace abuses.
60
The Obama Administration recently revamped the regulations applicable to guest worker programs.
61
The 54. FARMWORKER JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 23; Elmore, supra note 27, at 536-38. 55. FARMWORKER JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 22-23; S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 14, at 38-39; Britta S. Loftus, Coordinating U.S. Law on Immigration and Human Trafficking: Lifting the Lamp to Victims, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 143, 178 (2011) .
56. Elmore, supra note 27, at 561; Wishnie, supra note 15, at 1455. 57. 20 C.F.R. § § 655.100-.185, 655.1-.81 (2012) . 58. 29 C.F.R. § 501.0-.9, (2011); 20 C.F.R. § 655.2(a). 59. 20 C.F.R. § § 655.130-.135, 655.2(b) (2012) . 60. Elmore, supra note 27, at 545-46 (referring to guest worker rights as "illusory"); Garcia, supra note 19, at 51 (recognizing that abuses continue to exist despite the existence of strong worker protections on paper); Rathod, supra note 39, at 22 (discussing how H-2B regulatory changes fail to remedy the "core structural flaw" of portability of visas); Read, supra note 39, at 429 (referring to H-2A rights as "theoretical").
61. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. Such regulations may be subject to change depending on the politics of the incoming administration. the regulatory framework, especially with its more generalized requirements, still fails to give any specific hook for addressing the most egregious conduct of employers, such as intimidation, denial of medical care, and verbal and physical abuse. 65 Further, the regulations say "absolutely nothing about when or in what manner the agency must act."
66
Nor is there any affirmative requirement in the code that requires regular investigations or audits by WHD.
67
The regulations also fail to contemplate the practical reality that governmental offices are (Dec. 18, 2008) 64. The proposed H-2B regulations raise the standards to make them more analogous to the H-2A program. Rathod, supra note 39, at 23-25.
65. The regulations contain no explicit protections from this kind of behavior, except for the extremely limited provision that prohibits retaliation after a worker has "exercised or asserted" any right or protection afforded by the H-2A regulations. 20 C.F.R. § § 655.135(h) (5), 655.20(n)(5); see also FARMWORKER JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 15-16 (reviewing how the theoretical worker protections in the revised H-2A regulations do not apply to protect workers in practice); Lee, supra note 45 (discussing how the H-2A regulations do not address common abuses such as verbal abuse or lack of breaks).
66. Holley, supra note 27, at 601 (explaining how the H-2A regulations provide no timeline for workers' complaints in comparison to the strict timelines related to provisions that apply to employers).
67. It is noteworthy that the H-2B regulations require regular audits by ETA as to the certification applications, but not as to actual workplace conditions. 20 C.F.R. § 655.70 (2011). inaccessible to guest workers hoping to use the complaint procedure.
68
Apart from these structural inadequacies, WHD largely fails to pursue guest worker complaints because of a lack of will and resources.
69
This is evident in the lack of affirmative oversight and irregular inspection of employer worksites.
70
In 2004, for example, WHD investigated eighty-nine H-2A employers out of the thousands that participate in the program.
71
When WHD does carry out an investigation, it overwhelmingly fails to find meaningful violations or redress for workers, or it favors finding violations that can only be substantiated on paper. This study found: (1) WHD was slow to respond to complaints; (2) cases were "resolved" based on unverified information provided by the employer; and (3) WHD was reluctant to compel employers to pay when violations had been found. 74 When WHD has found substantial violations, ETA has subsequently failed to remove employers from the H-2 program. ETA has rarely employed its procedures for decertifying or barring LABOR, 1975 LABOR, -2004 LABOR, (2005 , available at http://www.brennancenter.org /page/-/d/download_file_35553.pdf.
employers from either H-2 program.
75
In 2009, for example, thirteen employers were barred nationally out of the estimated 13,800 employers that participate in the H-2 program.
76
The regulatory framework arguably requires the government to meet a high standard of proof in order to decertify employers. 77 ETA, for example, failed to bar an H-2A employer who had allegedly been involved in the physical abuse and starvation of its workers.
78
Despite the welldocumented abuses within these programs, ETA has thus far failed to perform its gatekeeping function to exclude the participation of employers that engage in fraud or abuse.
Even when labor abuses against guest workers rise to a criminal level, criminal charges are infrequently brought against the employer. Local law enforcement, particularly in the rural communities where many of the guest workers reside, has generally not been hospitable to guest workers. In one instance, a local sheriff pursued a criminal investigation of a legal-services attorney simply because she represented H-2A workers who had quit their jobs because of abusive conditions. 77. 20 C.F.R. § § 501.20, 655.73 (2011 The government's failure to enforce the rule of law with respect to guest workers contributes to the overall failure of these programs to stem the tide of abuses. This failure stems not only from the lack of resources and will but also from the structural inadequacies of the regulatory framework. While the government, however, has recently committed to increase enforcement of the H-2A program by launching a new initiative to tackle labor abuses against farm workers, 89 at its core, the government still refuses to redesign its policies in a meaningful way that would address this exploitation.
90
This continued contradiction in policies reflects a failure to resolve the economic reality of needing such workers with a commitment to giving them full rights.
91
As long as the government maintains this ambivalence, guest workers will continue to participate in a system that sanctions, if not promotes, abuse and exploitation. III. PRIVATE CIVIL REMEDIES In order to address a number of the systemic abuses within the guest worker programs, this Article examines the viability of using private civil remedies contained within the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, and antidiscrimination laws. These laws use a "private attorney general" enforcement model by providing for a private right of action to reach criminal conduct. 92 An examination of these private civil remedies suggests that they can be used to reach the more egregious forms of employer misconduct that naturally arise from a system that gives employers total control over their workers. The use of such remedies by guest workers can also contribute to reshaping the law by broadening the reach of such private civil remedies to address different forms of exploitation.
A. Trafficking Victims Protection Act
Congress enacted the TVPA to combat human trafficking through prosecution, prevention, and protection of victims.
93
Under the TVPA, the government expanded prosecutorial tools to pursue traffickers.
94
Victims of human trafficking are also eligible for protections, such as social services and immigration relief. 95 Further, the TVPA created a private right of action for victims of human trafficking.
96
Much of the criticism pertaining to the TVPA is devoted to the narrowness with which the government has implemented the mandate of the statute, particularly in viewing who is considered a "worthy" victim for purposes of prosecution or issuance of benefits.
97
In contrast, the private right of action under the TVPA has 92. They also provide a way for guest workers to assert claims in federal court. Guest workers can append their related state-law claims to their federal case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, especially those that arise from run-of-the-mill contract violations under the regulations. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (detailing the requirements for the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction). State courts in rural jurisdictions, where workers are usually located, can show bias against workers. Holley, supra note 27, at 608-13.
93. See supra note 21. 94. 18 U.S.C. § § 1589-94, 1596 (2006 Of all the remedies created by the TVPA, only the private right of action does not depend on government action or approval for its use. Many of the cases utilizing the private right of action, in fact, have proceeded without any parallel criminal prosecution.
99
Because many of the abuses inherent in the guest worker programs, such as recruitment debts, threats of deportation, and the confiscation of documents, are characteristic of human trafficking crimes, the private right of action under the TVPA is especially well suited to address these abuses. The private right of action, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1595, provides a civil remedy for any violation of the criminal laws addressing peonage, slavery, and human trafficking.
100
To date, all reported cases utilizing the private right of action involve cases of labor exploitation. REV. 403, 427 (2011) . This is in marked contrast to the federal prosecutions under the TVPA, which have favored victims of sex trafficking or victims of labor trafficking who were subject to sexual violence. Chang & Kim, supra note 27, at 324-25; Srikantiah, supra note 83, at 185. Overall, the number of labor prosecutions has increased over recent years. Shelley Cavalieri, The Eyes that Blind Us: The Overlooked Phenomenon of of labor exploitation that is considered to be human trafficking.
102
The 2008 amendments to the TVPA further reinforce this broader reading as well as expand the scope of liability under the TVPA.
103
Amendments to the TVPA in 2008 reinforce that physical force is unnecessary for the crime of forced labor.
104
They codify a broader concept of coercion that was discussed in both the original legislative history and several early judicial decisions. 105 An employer might coerce a worker by causing him to believe that if he did not labor he would suffer "serious harm," meaning "any harm, whether physical or nonphysical, including psychological, financial, or reputational harm, that is sufficiently serious." 106 Further, the amendments include a consideration of the victim's particular situation in determining whether the harm is sufficiently serious "to compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the same circumstances to perform or to continue performing labor or services in order to avoid incurring that harm."
107
The amendments also clarify that threatened abuse of the law is coercive if it was used "for any purpose for which the law was not designed, in order to exert pressure on another person." 108 Guest workers can take advantage of this expanded concept of nonphysical coercion under the TVPA since most guest worker cases do not involve physical abuse of the workers but rather threats of deportation as the main coercive element. 109 Under the TVPA, obtaining labor through threats of deportation can amount to an "abuse of law or legal process."
110
Guest workers may face a hurdle because threats of deportation can also appear to be advisements of legitimate consequences for noncompliance with the terms of an H-2 job. 111 Under 18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(1), however, guest workers can argue that the threat of deportation is being used for a "purpose for which the law was not designed" when the objective is to intimidate and coerce them. H-2B forestry workers were threatened with serious immigration consequences and reports to immigration if they were to leave the work prior to the end of their contract. 114 By examining the context of the threat, which included retaining personal documents, the court rejected defendants' argument that threats to report H-2B workers to immigration if they left their employment were merely informational rather than a "threatened abuse of the legal process" to ensure that the workers did not leave their employment.
115
Because of the common use of threats of deportation to control guest workers, 116 an examination of the threats' contextual circumstances is particularly significant to establishing nonphysical coercion. 117 Further, the TVPA's consideration of the victim's particular situation should be used to give the necessary explanation of how coercion operates within the guest worker context. While guest workers are not normally subject to physical restraint, other individual circumstances may explain why they are not free to leave their employment. In Ramos-Madrigal, the court rejected defendants' argument that the H-2B workers were free to return to Mexico at any time because it recognized that holding H-2B extension documents, in the course of threatening serious immigration consequences, was sufficient to "prevent [the workers] from leaving employment."
118
The confiscation of guest worker passports and visas is not an uncommon practice by employers.
119
In other cases, courts have confirmed that physical opportunities to escape cannot be equated with a lack of coercion under the TVPA if the circumstances indicate that the worker is otherwise compelled to remain.
120
Because a guest worker's return to his home country may facially appear to be an exit option, guest workers need to present 116. S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 14, at 16. 117. See United States v. Farrell, 563 F.3d 364, 373 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding the employers' threats of deportation against H-2B workers to be illegal coercion under 18 U.S.C. § 1584 despite the fact they were made as a consequence of failing to abide by the employers' rules). The court in Farrell also took into account the "special vulnerabilities" of the workers, which included that they were on temporary work visas sponsored by the employers and were entirely dependent on them for their housing and transportation. the court noted that plaintiffs, who were able to establish a claim for forced labor, "not only wanted, but needed to continue working," because of the massive debts they had accumulated in order to obtain their jobs.
125
A guest worker's strong desire to continue working and avoid being fired should similarly not undermine a claim alleging that the work was obtained through coercion.
126
The conflation of the desire and necessity to work as a guest worker may be tied to any number of reasons, such as recruitment debts or the personal humiliation in failing to provide for one's family. 127 Mainstream employers of guest workers often use contractors, supervisors, or recruiters to interact with employees, and it may be these individuals who commit the egregious abuses against workers.
128
The TVPA can reach an employer who knowingly benefits financially because of "participation in a venture" that the employer should have known was engaged in human trafficking. 122. Srikantiah, supra note 83, at 197-98 (describing that the TVPA favors "a victim completely under the trafficker's control and lacking in free will, unable even to escape until she is rescued by law enforcement").
123. Despite being cheated, many guest workers see their employment as the best chance to better the lives of their families. FARMWORKER JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 17; S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 14, at 12.
124 The use of the private right of action under the TVPA by various immigrant workers, including guest workers, has contributed to the positive reshaping of the TVPA. By effectively leveraging the TVPA, guest workers can target mainstream employers, as the case law reveals the broad reach of the TVPA and the broad class of individuals it protects.
131
In particular, guest workers can leverage recent court decisions that emphasize the contextual circumstances of the employment relationship, which have ultimately broadened the kind of coercion that is actionable under the TVPA.
132
Through its private right of action, therefore, the TVPA gives guest workers a tool to request redress for the criminal acts of their employers.
B. Racketeer and Influenced
Corrupt Organization Act Guest workers can also harness civil RICO to hold employers accountable even when the government fails to do so.
133
RICO was enacted in 1970 to combat organized crime by imposing both criminal and civil liability to attack the sources of its revenue.
134
The private right of action under civil RICO can reach criminal activity associated with fraudulent recruitment practices, deportation threats, 130. Despite its broader reach, the new reckless-disregard standard will undoubtedly still result in shielding employers from liability through the practice of contracting and subcontracting. Chacón, supra note 27, at 3003.
131. Nuñag-Tanedo v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1147 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (stating that "it is the duty of this Court to provide a forum for the alleged victims of forced labor, regardless of the severity of the alleged circumstances").
132 Preemption, 8 LAB. LAW. 335, 336-37 (1992) . Notwithstanding these critiques, this Part argues that civil RICO can be used to the benefit of immigrant workers.
134. See generally GREGORY P. JOSEPH, CIVIL RICO: A DEFINITIVE GUIDE 1-3 (2d ed. 2000) (stating the purposes behind the creation of RICO).
human trafficking, and fraud related to the H-2A and H-2B visa paperwork.
135
There has been scant attention paid to the use of civil RICO claims by immigrant workers against employers for abusive labor practices.
136
In contrast, the use of civil RICO against employers that violate immigration laws by hiring undocumented workers is well known.
137
Such lawsuits gained notoriety as an end-run around government enforcement of the unlawful hiring of undocumented workers.
138
Civil RICO, however, can also operate as an express antidote to lax government enforcement of labor abuses to the benefit of guest workers. § 1964(c) (2006) . Further, the injury needs to be economic and proximately caused by the predicate acts. Berg v. First State Ins. Co., 915 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir. 1990); Grogan v. Platt, 835 F.2d 844, 846-48 (11th Cir. 1988) . A plaintiff needs to allege not only that her injuries were direct, rather than derivative, but also that they were proximately caused by the RICO violation. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U. S. 258, 268-70 (1992) . Some factors to examine as to whether the injury is too remote include: number of crimes that have been statutorily enumerated at 18 U.S.C. § 1961. A pattern of racketeering activity requires the commission of at least two predicate acts over the course of ten years.
141
A plaintiff must also establish "standing" by properly asserting a "violation of section 1962," which includes defendant's operation of an "enterprise." § 1962(b) requires that a defendant acquire or maintain, through a pattern of racketeering activity, any interest or control of any enterprise. The use of § § 1962(a) and 1962(b) is difficult because they require a showing that there was an actual injury from the investment of the income or acquisition of the enterprise. Injury stemming from the commission of predicate acts alone is insufficient. See, e.g., Abraham v. Singh, 480 F.3d 351, 356-57 (5th Cir. 2007 ) (dismissing claims brought under § § 1962(a)-(b) for failure to show the requisite injuries). A violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) requires that the defendant, who is employed by or associated with the enterprise, conduct or participate in the conduct of such an "enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity." While the actual injury can stem from the racketeering activity, the defendant must be a distinct entity from the enterprise. Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001) .
143. An "enterprise" includes both legitimate and illegitimate organizations. United States v. Turkette, 452 U. S. 576, 580-81 (1981) . Several common abuses of guest workers can constitute racketeering acts that are actionable under civil RICO. An employer's exploitation of guest workers is often premised on false promises made to workers at the time of recruitment.
145
In Magnifico v. Villanueva, 146 the court allowed plaintiffs to proceed on their claims of fraudulent recruitment under a theory that the fraudulent recruitment constituted the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud.
147
Plaintiffs were citizens of the Philippines who were recruited to work on H-2B visas at various country clubs in Florida and New York.
148
When they arrived, however, they were placed in severely crowded housing, worked long hours, and faced exorbitant deductions for food, housing, and transportation, despite having been promised that these benefits would be free of charge.
149
The court accepted that plaintiffs had adequately alleged that defendants committed the racketeering acts of mail and wire fraud by having made false promises or misrepresentations about the terms and conditions of the job and by having used the mail and wires to do so.
150
Guest workers may argue that employer abuses amount to the commission of the predicate act of visa fraud pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1546. Since guest workers are present on H-2A or H-2B visas, the employer may have committed fraud associated with their visa applications. The court in Magnifico, for example, held that plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged visa fraud by arguing that the employer's applications for H-2B visas contained material misrepresentations about the true terms and conditions of the job. and H-2B applications for labor certification require that employers sign under the penalty of perjury that, among other things, the employer will comply with all "Federal, State and local employmentrelated laws and regulations." 152 Any knowing misrepresentation that the employer would comply with such laws is arguably actionable under the visa-fraud provision.
153
Employers commonly engage in verbal abuse that can include threats to intimidate and control guest workers. Threats to induce fear, including threats of deportation, can constitute the predicate act of extortion either under 18 U.S.C. § 1951 or via a state-law equivalent of extortion law under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A).
154
In Nuñag-Tanedo, the court found that plaintiffs, who were professional guest workers, had adequately pleaded the racketeering act of extortion because they had sufficiently alleged that defendants' threats of deportation and financial ruin amounted to the "wrongful use of fear."
155
In particular, the court focused on the circumstances of plaintiffs as immigrant workers who had incurred substantial debts to conclude that the "threatened deprivation of income and the ability to continue working in the United States was wrongful." unlawful confiscation of documents.
157
A civil RICO claim may be made based on any racketeering act related to human trafficking enumerated at 18 U.S.C. § § 1581-1592. 158 Plaintiffs can face hurdles in properly pleading a civil RICO claim, and the failure to do so can be the death knell for a case. 159 Since many civil RICO claims sound in fraud, a complaint must meet the heightened pleading requirements of the "who, what, where and when" required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). 160 Guest workers, however, can take advantage of case law that permits courts to relax such heightened pleading standards when knowledge of an employer's operations is peculiarly within the possession of defendants. 161 Guest workers have successfully managed to characterize many egregious abuses in their employment as predicate acts under civil RICO. 162 Civil RICO's private right of action can extend to abusive acts that are otherwise not actionable under the existing regulatory system or regulated by the government. In doing so, guest workers can statutorily seek treble damages to reach the illicit profits made by employers from their exploitation.
163
Civil RICO claims, therefore, give guest workers another tool for redressing an employer's criminal conduct.
C. Racial Harassment and Hostile Work Environment
In the guest worker context, discrimination claims have largely focused on the unlawful preference exhibited toward guest workers over U.S. workers.
164
The popular media regularly reports on this preference by sympathetically portraying farmers who bemoan the difficulties of being forced to employ U.S. workers who have "gotten soft." 165 The subtext of this preference for guest workers is well known. Because of the inherent vulnerability of guest workers, employers are able to "squeeze out maximum productivity at minimal labor cost," while engaging in abusive labor practices.
166
Not surprisingly, employers may engage in such abuses, in part, because of their underlying prejudices against guest workers.
167
Being able to prove such discrimination has historically been difficult because of the general lack of evidence that non-guest workers were being treated more favorably. See, e.g., Reyes-Gaona v. N.C. Growers Ass'n, 250 F.3d 861, 866 (4th Cir. 2001 ) (holding that ADEA claims could not be applied extraterritorially for an H-2A worker claiming that he had been denied a job in the United States based on his age); Olvera-Morales v. Int'l Labor Mgmt. Corp., 05-CV-00559, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3502, at *34-35 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 1, 2008 (permitting sex discrimination claims to proceed against an employer who offered less favorable work to its female H-2B employees).
165. See, e.g., Kirk Johnson, Hiring Locally for Farm Work Is No Cure-All, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2011, at A1; Erik Ortiz, Foreign Workers, Not Laid-Off Locals, Filling Seasonal Jobs, PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY (Apr. 6, 2010) , available at http://www.pressofatlanticcity.com/news /press/cape_may/article_fc82f8a6-40ba-11df- 9697-001cc4c002e0.html; Dan Rather, Help Not Wanted?, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 13, 2010) , http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dan-rather/help -not-wanted_b_761132.html.
166. FARMWORKER JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 17. 167. Id. at 27; S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 14, at 34-36. 168. Most employers solely employ guest workers. Leticia Saucedo has noted the inherent difficulties in disparate impact and/or treatment claims for "brown collar" immigrant workers in segregated workplaces because the current proof frameworks hinder successful litigation on these A more readily available remedy for guest workers may be to claim racial or national origin harassment based on a hostile work environment. Guest workers can bring racial or national origin discrimination claims for what amounts to criminal behavior by the employer pursuant to Title VII or 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 169 Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on an individual's race or national origin.
170
Plaintiffs in Title VII cases may also seek relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which covers discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, and sometimes alienage. 169. This discussion is limited to the tools of race and national origin discrimination that are applicable to all guest workers, although the EEOC has taken on an increasing number of cases alleging sex discrimination based on criminal sexual behavior against female immigrant workers. See Complaint, EEOC v. La Pianta, LLC, No. 09-cv-00303-RHW (E.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2009) § 1981(a) . Section 1981 has been extended to include persons of immigrant ethnic groups, so long as the plaintiffs allege that the discrimination is based on their race or ethnicity rather than their national origin. See Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Ariz., Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 850 (9th Cir. 2004 ) ("Although national origin discrimination is not within the ambit of § 1981, race has been defined broadly to cover immigrant ethnic groups."). Section 1981 claims are treated similarly to claims brought under Title VII. See, e.g., Eliserio v. United Steelworkers of Am., 398 F.3d 1071 , 1076 (8th Cir. 2005 Williams v. Waste Mgmt. of Ill., Inc., 361 F.3d 1021 , 1028 (7th Cir. 2004 . Section 1981, however, provides for a few advantages over Title VII, including a longer statute of limitations, the lack of caps on certain damages, and the ability to reach smaller employers. Lewis L. Maltby & David C. Yamada, Beyond "Economic Realities": The Case for Amending Federal Employment Discrimination Laws to Include Independent Contractors, 38 B.C. L. REV. 239, 256-57 (1997) . Further, it may also reach alienage discrimination, although the case law is mixed. Compare Bhandari v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 829 F.2d 1343 , 1351 (en banc), vacated, 492 U.S. 901 (1987 (en banc), vacated, 492 U.S. 901 ( ), opinion reinstated, 887 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1989 ) (per curiam) (holding that the protections of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 do not extend to prohibit alienage discrimination), with Anderson v. Conboy, 156 F.3d 167, 180 (2d Cir. 1998 ) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides a claim against private discrimination on the basis of alienage).
construct a claim of hostile work environment. Further, guest workers can allege a claim of racial or national origin harassment independent of the burden associated with the traditional comparators necessary to establish a disparate treatment or impact claim.
In the case of a hostile work environment based on race or national origin, the legal framework is equivalent to that used for cases of sexual harassment.
172
An objectionable environment "must be both objectively and subjectively offensive."
173
The harassment must be based on race or national origin and be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms of conditions of employment and create a hostile or abusive environment.
174
A few isolated incidents of racial enmity are insufficient to find liability 175 because the work environment must be so "heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy the emotional and psychological stability of the minority [employee] ." Multiple derogatory remarks based on the workers' national origin supported the finding of a hostile work environment under Title VII and § 1981. 179 More notably, the court used the employer's threats of physical harm and deportation back to India to support its harassment finding.
180
In particular, the court examined how the threats to send the workers back to India were coercive because plaintiffs feared the possible harm that awaited themselves 172. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2012) and their families upon their return, including the potential for financial ruin.
181
As they did in Chellen, guest workers can present acts of intimidation, including threats of deportation, as harassment based on race and/or national origin. In David v. Signal International, Inc., 182 H-2B workers from India alleged that their employer maintained a hostile and abusive work environment based on race, national origin, and alienage through the actions and statements of its personnel in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 183 Besides offensive language and insults, workers were subjected to multiple threats of deportation and false imprisonment in guarded labor camps.
184 In EEOC v. Global Horizons, Inc., 185 H-2A workers from Thailand alleged discriminatory harassment on the basis of race and national origin.
186
Global Horizons had allegedly engaged in largely criminal behavior by regularly intimidating and threatening workers with deportation, arrest, and physical violence, and by unlawfully confiscating their identification documents.
187
While neither of these cases has resulted in a court decision on these claims, the viability of a racial or national origin harassment claim based on criminal behavior is promising based on the developments in the analogous claim of sexual harassment. discrimination cases, courts consider the "totality of the circumstances" in evaluating whether the harms are sufficiently severe and pervasive to create a hostile work environment.
189
In particular, Martha Chamallas has explained that "room has been cleared for fact finders to consider the background social identities of the actors and power dynamics at the workplace before they decide whether actionable harm has occurred."
190
Such contextual analysis has allowed courts to find, for example, that verbal abuse and threats of physical violence that were not overtly sexual could constitute sexual harassment.
191
Facially neutral abusive conduct can support a finding of discrimination sufficient to sustain a hostile-workenvironment claim when the conduct is viewed in the context of other overtly discriminatory conduct.
192
Similarly, the confiscation of documents, threats of deportation, and false imprisonment can help establish a hostile work environment claim if coupled with other discriminatory conduct, such as derogatory comments or insults, against guest workers.
193
Seemingly neutral acts of intimidation and abuse that are endemic to guest worker programs can assist in constructing a claim of harassment based on race or national origin. Examining the totality of the circumstances provides an opportunity to explain how the power dynamics of guest worker programs can lend themselves to a hostile work environment. Further, the advantage of pleading such neutral acts of intimidation and abuse that appear criminal in nature is that they are objectively severe. RICO. 195 They were able to allege, for example, that their employer used threats of deportation as coercion to subject them to forced labor under the TVPA.
196
Under civil RICO, plaintiffs claimed that defendants had engaged in a pattern and practice of visa fraud by requiring them to perform work that was unauthorized by their visas.
197
Further, plaintiffs alleged that defendants' use of threats and intimidation, including an attempt to get one worker to rescind his workers' compensation claim, amounted to the wrongful use of fear under the civil RICO predicate act of extortion.
198
In making such claims, these workers were able to control their own case and did not have to rely on the governmental agencies that ultimately failed them. Rather, they were able to achieve a resolution on their own terms, which, in addition to monetary damages, provided injunctive-type relief requiring the employer to implement new policies monitored for a period of two years.
199
The use of private civil remedies, therefore, can create worker agency by vindicating individual rights and enforcing workplace norms. Guest workers need not rely on government agencies that shift enforcement priorities with each change in administration and also lack the resources or will to enforce the laws. 196 . Id. at *24. 197. Id. at *18-20. 198. Id. at *24. 199. Settlement and General Release Agreement at iii, Velasquez Catalan, No. 06-cv-01043 (D. Colo. May 28, 2008 ) (on file with author). The terms of the agreement required the employer, for example, to develop an employee handbook in Spanish, permit workers to occasionally take trips off the ranch, and facilitate the purchase of cell phones. Id. at iii-iv.
200. Stumpf & Friedman, supra note 16, at 135 (explaining that the private right of action under the civil-rights laws was to address the concern that "the State will be less likely to exercise rely on a feckless regulatory system that fails to reach the more egregious abuses by employers. Rather, they can, on their own initiative, use private civil remedies to address employer exploitation and request compensatory damages, punitive damages, or injunctive relief.
201
In the process, they can contribute to creating new legal precedents that help advance the laws combating workplace exploitation. 202 The award of damages can provide vindication to plaintiffs that they have achieved some form of justice and positively impacted the lives of existing workers or future employees. 203 Guest workers potentially have increased access to the use of these private civil remedies because they provide for attorneys' fees.
204
The availability of attorneys' fees expands the pool of available lawyers beyond the limited resources of the nonprofit organizations that have traditionally represented underserved guest workers. The additional complexities that arise from litigating a case on behalf of guest workers, however, may practically limit the willingness of some within the private bar to take on such cases. 205 Nonetheless, the availability of attorneys' fees increases the ability of those without adequate resources to enforce the law, 206 and it can give increased access to legal representation for guest workers to vindicate their rights.
Through these private civil remedies, guest workers can also access the courts to tell their stories. Storytelling can have a cathartic effect as well as promote solidarity among workers. 207 Further, this telling of stories can contribute to the counternarrative about guest worker exploitation in the public discourse. 208 Cases involving private civil remedies have helped to create a counternarrative that undermines the dominant assumption that guest worker programs provide a convenient solution to both employers with labor shortages and immigrant workers seeking jobs. 209 In particular, high-profile guest worker cases have most likely contributed to policy changes to the guest worker programs, but they have not been enough to eradicate the programs. 210 The increased use of private civil remedies by guest workers can publicly expose how these programs sanction, if not promote, criminal exploitation. The resulting narratives can confer legitimacy on the necessary agenda of substantially modifying or eradicating guest worker programs that compromise individual liberty. 211 While the discussion in this Article has thus far focused on guest workers, private civil remedies can be extended to the much larger population of immigrant workers who work without authorization ("unauthorized migrants") to vindicate their rights. In John 212 for example, unauthorized migrants sued under both the TVPA and civil RICO based on allegations that they worked and lived under constant surveillance to pay off smuggling debts. 213 The workers reached a settlement with some parties and received a default judgment of $7.8 million against others. 214 In another example, Inc., 215 unauthorized migrants sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for a hostile and abusive work environment, alleging that their employer threatened not only to withhold their pay but also to call authorities to have them arrested and detained. 216 The case settled for a court-enforced judgment of $75,000. 217 While unauthorized migrants can employ private civil remedies, it should be recognized that they may not be able to access the full range of damages because of Hoffman Plastics Compounds v. NLRB.
218
In Hoffman Plastics, the Court held that the NLRB could not award an undocumented worker with back pay as a remedy. 219 While the impact of Hoffman Plastics is still developing with respect to the availability of back pay for unauthorized workers, 220 courts have reaffirmed that certain damages still remain available, such as unpaid wages for work performed, compensatory damages for pain and suffering, and punitive damages. 221 Unauthorized migrants, therefore, can similarly use such private civil remedies to take control of their own claims by seeking damages while telling their story of exploitation. 222 By focusing on criminal exploitation by employers, the use of private civil remedies has the potential to reframe the debate about immigrant workers and broaden the discussion to include the exploitation of all low-wage workers. Government policies that have criminalized immigration law and subsequently led to the increased prosecution of immigrant workers 223 have cultivated the public perception of immigrant criminality. 224 The use of private rights of action under the TVPA, civil RICO, and antidiscrimination laws can shift the focus from the presumption of the criminality of immigrants to the actual criminal conduct of the employer in exploiting workers. Hiroshi Motumura has noted that courts are more willing to recognize the rights of unauthorized migrants when the employer is engaged in more serious wrongdoing. 225 Further, the criminality of employers has advanced immigrant workers' rights in other arenas by broadening the discussion to the exploitation of all low-wage workers. The movements to end wage theft have successfully emphasized the criminality of employers through direct actions by publicly shaming employers and pushing to criminalize the nonpayment of wages. 226 Laws that punish employers for criminal exploitation of all workers can be more politically palatable because they appear facially neutral on the inflammatory question of immigrants. The passage of laws addressing wage theft has occurred, in part, because broad coalitions of low-wage workers have come together to push such legislation. 227 By comparatively characterizing the employer's wrongdoing as criminal, private civil remedies can potentially contribute to reshaping the public's imagination about immigrant workers and can frame worker exploitation within the greater context of the government's failure to protect all low-wage workers.
Any discussion about using private civil remedies as part of a broader strategy to vindicate immigrant workers' rights, however, must be balanced against a reality in which workers legitimately fear reporting workplace exploitation. It is well known that all immigrant workers, whether unauthorized migrants or guest workers, are reluctant to report exploitation, much less use the judicial system to enforce their rights, largely because of fear of retaliation and deportation. 228 Outreach and education efforts, in collaboration with community-based organizations, provide information to workers about their rights so that they can make informed choices about their options.
229
The availability of crime-related victim visas can provide some protection that may tip the balance toward convincing certain immigrant workers to come forward. 230 Further, in a number of cases filed by immigrant workers, courts have prohibited discovery into immigration status, finding that the prejudicial impact of the disclosure of such information was outweighed by its irrelevance to the claims of workplace exploitation. 231 In cases where workers fear retaliation by the employers, such as blacklisting, deportation, and V. CONCLUSION This Article has illustrated the positive attributes that come with the devolution of rights from the federal government to individual workers by describing the potential power of private civil remedies for guest workers who suffer from workplace exploitation. Without private civil remedies, the H-2A cattle herders at the Introduction of this Article would have had no recourse and been left to suffer as passive victims of an apathetic state. Instead, these workers had the opportunity to tell their own story while seeking justice for themselves and other workers. As the debate about the broken immigration system in the United States continues, lawmakers will continue to seek to expand current guest worker programs. 237 Based on its past record, the government will likely continue to fail to stem the tide of the endemic abuses associated with these programs. Guest workers, therefore, will continue to need to look toward private civil remedies as a means of enforcing their rights and improving workplace conditions. To this effect, private civil remedies can play a modest role in the movement to realize full labor and employment protections for immigrant workers.
